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Article 3

The Ideology of Tax Avoidance
William B. Barker*
Over and over again the courts have said that there is something
sinister in so arranging one's affairs so as to keep taxes as low as
possible. The rich do so, but they do wrong; for everybody owes a
public duty to pay what is fair and equitable. Taxes are exactions for
the general welfare; they should not be voluntary contributions for the
rich and forced exactions for the poor. To demand less in the name of
the people is to recant the values of democracy.1
I. INTRODUCTION

Tax avoidance is recognized today by practically all governments as
a serious threat to the integrity of tax systems in democratic societies.
However, effective deterrence in a manner that comports with the
principles of a free society is an awesome task. This task cannot be
accomplished without identifying and challenging the ideological basis
that fosters tax avoidance in order to begin the process of establishing
the democratic core value of equality as an insinuating principle of
2
income tax law.
Tax avoidance is a common term in tax law and scholarship. Though
the concept is sometimes explicitly used in statutes, 3 it is more often an
underlying premise for legislative, administrative, or judicial action
targeting taxpayer conduct that is perceived to undermine fair and
equitable taxation.
* Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.

The

substance of this paper was presented at the Loyola University Chicago Law Journalconference,

"Tax Law in a Liberal Democracy: Exploring the Relationship Between Tax and Good
Governance." I wish to express special thanks to my co-panelists Lawrence Zelenak and Leo
Martinez. Research for this paper was undertaken as part of an ATAX Research Fellowship as a
visiting professor at the University of New South Wales.
1. The foregoing intentionally reverses the sentiment found in Judge Learned Hand's
statement in Comm'r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting).
See infra text accompanying note 33 for the actual statement.
2.

See generally William

B. Barker,

The

Three Faces of Equality: Constitutional

Requirements in Taxation, 57 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1 (2006) (arguing that the power to tax is
naturally circumscribed in constitutional norms between the people and government such as
equality).
3. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 269, 482 (2000).
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The term tax avoidance does not have a limiting and definite
meaning. Instead, the term is a label for describing pragmatic decision-4
making, which by "pricking a line through concrete applications"
identifies abusive situations. The results of experience have led to a
kind of predictability under U.S. law that supports propositions such as,
"[e]xperienced tax professionals can usually readily distinguish tax
shelters from real transactions" and "[g]ood tax 5lawyers know when
they are pushing hard at the edge of the envelope."
Sophisticated guesswork is not the same as the legal certainty
expected of tax law under the rule of law. The result is that it is difficult
to treat tax avoidance as a category, like negligence, that is a normative
legal prescription demanding action. Ultimately, even in the case of
anti-avoidance legislation, it is the legal profession, and the judge in
particular, who determines what really constitutes impermissible
avoidance. Dealing with the problems of tax avoidance involves actions6
traditionally considered outside the conventional role of the judge.
This leaves legislatures, administrators, and jurists confronting an ever
shifting landscape of taxpayer responses to taxation with a principle
that, while found in taxation, is really not part of the law.
Consequently, the judicial response to legislative and even judicial antiavoidance regimes has been that they are dealing with something
extraordinary-a remedy that should be used sparingly because of an
essential arbitrariness which always borders on opening Pandora's
7
Box.
In the United States, the shift in judicial attitudes toward tax
avoidance has been profound. Early in the history of income taxation in
America, as the nation was confronting the overwhelming problems
resulting from the Great Depression, Congress and the courts faced
significant planning by taxpayers that deprived the government of
revenue at a time when it could ill afford to lose income. 8 The result
was a more substantive, open-ended legal method for tax legislation that

4.

Bazley v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 737, 741 (1974).

5.

JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE 126 (2005).

6. See William B. Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law to Promote
Democratic Policy: The Example of the Move to Capital Gains Taxation in Post-ApartheidSouth
Africa, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 703, 726-27 (2005).
7. See Yuri Grbich, Does Spotless Exorcise Barwick's Ghost?, in TAX CATCH-UPS: A
PROSPECT INTELLIGENCE REPORT 88, 105-12 (Robert L. Deutsch ed., 1997) for an excellent
account of the judiciary's struggles with implementing Australia's General Anti-Avoidance Rule.
8. President Roosevelt's Message to Congress on Tax Evasion and Avoidance (June 17,
1937), reprinted in U.S. REVENUE ACTS 1909-1950, 20 THE LAWS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 2 (Bernard D. Reams ed., 1979).
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was a radical departure from previous interpretation methods.9 This
development in tax jurisprudence reached its apex during the years of
the Warren court. It should come as no surprise that the court
responsible for the highest advancement of the human rights of those
who were most traditionally disadvantaged by our system would be the
same court that purposefully interpreted tax law restricting its abuse by
those who are traditionally advantaged by our system.
Since then, the tide has turned. Literalism in the interpretation of tax
legislation now dominates. Though the U.S. Tax Court has recently
adopted a more intentionalist approach to tax legislation, it has not met
with success on appeal. 10 Tax law is now dominated by the approach of
the U.S. district courts, courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court, which
have turned increasingly to a plain meaning approach.' 1
A legal method based on strict or literal interpretation is the prop that
sustains tax avoidance. It, in turn, is nurtured by the ideology of
liberty. 12 The consequence is that in the United States, the federal
courts have readopted the ideology that underpins tax avoidance.
This paper takes a small step. As suggested by its beginning quote,
this paper shall examine tax avoidance by challenging the traditional
starting point. This paper will show that the ideology underpinning tax
avoidance is in direct conflict with core democratic values. This
ideology leads to a moral perspective that supports a right to avoid over
a duty to pay a fair share of taxes. In a democratic society that values
taxation in accordance with fairness, that moral perspective is wrong. It
exalts individual license over democratic ideas about what income tax
law requires of citizens. Freeing tax law from this ideology will

9. See William B. Barker, Statutory Interpretation, ComparativeLaw, and Economic Theory:
Discovering the Grund of Income Taxation, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 821, 830-32, 850-59 (2003)
(tracing the change from formalism to intentionalism in the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to
interpretation that took place from 1930-1956).
10. See generally David F. Shores, Textualism and Intentionalism in Tax Litigation, 61 TAX
LAW. 53 (2007). Shores' study of the appeals of ten Tax Court cases that used an intentionalist

approach showed in every case a reversal by the court of appeals using a plain meaning or
textualist approach to statutory interpretation. Id. at 62-64.
11. Id. at 63; see also Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters,
24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004); Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and Tax Cases, 66
TEMP. L. REV. 445 (1993); Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose,
2 FLA. TAX REV. 492 (1995); Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal
Incoherence, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 771 (1997); Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The
Judiciary's Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115 (2004); Andre L.
Smith, The DeliberativeStylings of Leading Tax Law Scholars, 61 TAX LAW. 1 (2007); Lawrence
Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L.
REV. 623 (1986).
12. See infra Part ll.B.
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promote a moral perspective of compliance, thus providing a new
starting point for developing a sustainable approach to curbing
avoidance.

II. VALUES IN CONFLICT
The nature of tax avoidance can best be understood in terms of the
conflicting values that seek their meaning through income tax law. To
discover these essences, start with the notion that tax avoidance deals
with the incongruence between the intent or object of the statute in
taxing a particular situation the way it does or the purpose of the statute
in giving a particular benefit to the taxpayer, and the tax outcome
advanced by the taxpayer. 13 In most cases, it is said that the tax
outcome determined on the basis of the taxpayer's situation is supported
by a reading of the statute but not necessarily with the statute's intent or
policy. 14 As President Franklin Roosevelt stated in an address to
Congress:
All [methods of avoidance] are alike in that they are definitely
contrary to the spirit of the law. All are alike in that they represent a
determined effort on the part of those who use them to dodge the
payment of taxes which Congress based on ability to pay. All are
alike in that failure to pay results
in shifting the tax load to the
15
shoulders of those less able to pay.
These taxpayer outcomes achieve tax results that seem to defy the
16
logic of taxation.
These results are in accordance, however, with the logic of another
value system. This other value system promotes the individual value of
liberty over the individual and collective value of equality. Thus, tax
avoidance operates in the limbo created by the antagonism between the
ideology underpinning income taxation and the ideology underpinning
tax avoidance.
A. The Ideology of Income Taxation
Ideologies are systems of ideas about the goals, values, and
13.

See R.W. PARSONS,

INCOME TAXATION

IN

AUSTRALIA: PRINCIPLES OF INCOME,

DEDUCTIBILITY AND TAX ACCOUNTING 844-45 (1985).
14. Id.; see also Heen, supra note 11, at 771 (explaining that a literal interpretation ignores
"the rich range of contextual and policy considerations that inform" the tax law).
15. President Roosevelt's Message to Congress on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, supra note 8,
at 2.
16. For example, the Supreme Court, discussing the statutory policy of not allowing double
benefits or exclusion from income and inclusion in basis for debt discharge, remarked that
"[b]ecause the Code's plain text permits the taxpayers here to receive these benefits, we need not
address this policy concern." Gitlitz v. Comm'r, 531 U.S. 206, 220 (2001).
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aspirations of a society or of a particular social group. Comprehensive
income taxation derives its legitimacy from its democratic ideological
values. Income taxation was believed to advance the value of equality
in accordance with ability to pay. 17 Taxation in accordance with ability
to pay or means is a constitutional requirement in many countries and in
several American states. 18 American legislative history singled out the
justice of ability to pay as the most important reason for the adoption of
the federal income tax system pursuant to the Sixteenth Amendment. 19
Progressive income taxation in America was the result of a bitter
class struggle to reduce the role of regressive consumption taxes and
impose larger levels of tax on those with greater means and wealth.2 °
History confirms that the income tax law was social legislation that had
the strongest claim to democratic legitimacy because it was the result of
the demands of public opinion at a time when, in the words of Thomas
21
Jefferson, the "spirit of the people [was] up."
B. The Ideology of Tax Avoidance
Frustrating these social and legislative goals is the fact that many
persons with significant means do not pay a fair share of taxes
consistent with the values of income taxation. 22 One reason for this is a
common judicial antagonism to the values of income taxation. A
leading jurist expressed the opinion that tax legislation lacked moral
values:
Law is all about the rules which society imposes upon its members for
the regulation of their conduct. Elementary fairness dictates that if
rules are to be imposed in an area in which there is no universal moral
imperative to aid understanding,they shall be clear and unequivocal,
so that the subject may know with certainty what he or she may and
may not do and23what are the legal consequences of any projected
course of action.
The concept of tax without a concept of right fosters tax avoidance

17. H.R. REP. NO. 63-5, at XXXVII (1913). See generally Barker, supra note 9, at 860-61.
18. See Barker, supra note 2, at 8-10.
19. H.R. REP. No. 63-5, at XXXVII. See generallyBarker, supra note 9, at 860-61.
20. H.R. REP. NO. 63-5, at XXXVII; see also Barker, supra note 9, at 860.
21. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 140, 141 (Memorial ed. 1904).
22. See generally DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS
(1999) (addressing the "growing level of tax avoidance behavior"); see also President Roosevelt's
Message to Congress on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, supra note 8, at 2.
23. Lord Oliver of Aylemerton, Judicial Approaches to Revenue Law, in STRIKING THE
BALANCE: TAX ADMINISTRATION, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE IN THE 1990S, at 174
(Malcolm Gammie & Adrian Shipwright eds., 1996) (emphasis added).
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because tax avoidance, in the value system of the legal profession, has a
strong ideological basis.
The ideological support for tax avoidance is the right of liberty, that
is, the liberty of the subject to be free from an overreaching
24
government, the freedom of property, and the freedom to contract.
Liberty in the context of tax is the value system of a particular social
group, those with means, who follow the philosophy that "the prosperity
of the middle and lower classes depend[s] upon the good fortunes and
light taxes of the rich." 2 5 Liberty here masks the underlying goal of this
class to reestablish the incidence of the tax burden on others. Thus,
liberty provides the security to pursue an unfettered life as a consumer.
Liberty grants to every person who has the wherewithal to pay the right
to treat tax savings as a commodity in civil society that can be invented,
patented, and purchased just like a new car. In fact, one can obtain
insurance that compensates when one does not receive the intended tax
26
benefit.
The differences between the liberal rights ideology of liberty and the
ideology of equality are critical. Equality in taxation stands squarely on
the shoulders of a progressive movement in taxation that asserts that the
political goals of taxation are substantive equality and redistributional
justice. 27 Though the modem advocates of ability to pay may have
abandoned its class basis 2 8 and thus robbed the concept of much of its
force, the class politics of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution
and the Revenue Act of 1913 were clear. 29 In those more truthful times,
Dr. T.S. Adams, a former high treasury official, concluded that "[c]lass
politics is of the essence of taxation." 30 Henry Simons set forth the
political nature of the case for progressive income taxation as follows:
"The case for drastic progression in taxation must be rested on the case
against inequality-on the ethical or aesthetic judgment that the
prevailing distribution of wealth and income reveals a degree (and/or
31
kind) of inequality which is distinctly evil or unlovely."
24. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 49
(1986). See generally GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX:
ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF AFISCAL CONsnTUTION (1980).
25. LouIs EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 63 (1961) (quoting Secretary of the
Treasury Andrew Mellon).
26. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 113-14.
27. See Barker, supra note 9, at 864. See generally JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX
AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1985).
28. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 25, at 12.
29. See Barker, supra note 9, at 860-61.
30. T.S. Adams, Ideals and Idealism in Taxation, 18 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 1 (1928).
31. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 18-19 (1938). Henry Simons also
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Equality is not simply an ideology; it is the purpose acknowledged by
Congress for the adoption of the income tax law. 32 The purpose of the
legislation, taxation in accordance with ability to pay, is as much a part
of the law as the language of the text itself. In contrast, liberty uses the
ideology of formal equality, or equality before the law, as a mask for
one class's political goal of shifting the burden of any significant taxes
from the few to the many. It is not the democratic political process, but
rather the neutral concept of legal certainty that leads to this outcome.
The ideology of liberty, however, is not part of the tax law and is
derived by the legal profession in accordance with the liberal
conception of the rule of law. Thus, liberty is the ideological basis of
legal methodology in taxation.
Liberty has prevailed against a strong democratic mandate of
substantive equality due to the adoption by the legal profession of the
liberal ideology of tax avoidance. Legal methodology is outside
legislation yet has the power to negate its essential purpose.
III. THE MORALITY OF TAX AVOIDANCE: TURNING TAx AVOIDANCE
UPSIDE DOWN AND INSIDE OUT

Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so
arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody
does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public
duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions,
not voluntary
contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is
33
mere cant.
Judge Learned Hand's famous lines have been quoted so often that
their point of view must clearly be that of the judiciary. 34 The social
judgment of the tax professional is that tax avoidance is not bad
35
behavior.
The incidence of tax avoidance is explained and justified as "a
market response by the taxpayer to a tax structure that is non-neutral
believed that the purpose of taxation in accordance with ability to pay, that is mitigating
disparities of wealth, was too settled to require further debate. Id.; see also HENRY C. SIMONS,
FEDERAL TAX REFORM 144 (1950).
32. See supra Part H.A.
33. Comm'r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting).
34. BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS 1-26 (1988) (noting that Judge Hand's "central message... is widely accepted").
35. See Pamela F. Olson, Now That You've Caught the Bus, What Are You Going to Do With
It? Observations from the Frontlines, the Sidelines and Between the Lines, So to Speak, 2006
Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax Counsel, in 60 TAX LAW. 567

(2007). Ms. Olson, former Undersecretary for Tax Policy, opined that tax avoidance is not evil.
Id. at 567.
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and discriminatory." 36 Loopholes and tax planning opportunities are
seen as safety valves for systems that overtax persons and enterprises.
The human proclivity to evade or avoid has been described as follows:
The attempt to avoid paying taxes is a reaction against the constraints
imposed by any tax. It is universal and an inevitable consequence of
the very existence of taxes. "Tax and evasion are as inseparable as a
man and his shadow." Payment of taxes symbolizes submission. It
provokes a feeling of powerlessness by creating a direct bufferless
relationship between the isolated, defenceless individual and the state
Moloch. It is experienced as a restriction on a person's freedom and
interference with his fundamental aspirations for power and prestige.
It strikes at the very core of the tax-payer's being, provoking an
affective and wholly irrational
reaction similar to "a child's reactions
37
to parental domination."
Consequently, failing to gain a tax advantage and having one's taxes
38
increase due to unsuccessful tax avoidance is deemed to be a penalty.
Though these sentiments may not be publicly shared by all, 39 tax
counsel consider themselves morally justified and economically
compelled to develop tax savings strategies for the benefit of their
40
clients.
In general, nations recognize a right of tax planning. 4 1 In some
countries this right to choose lesser taxed alternatives is understood as a
general exception to constitutional rules that specifically prohibit the
strict or literal interpretation of laws. 42 Courts in Belgium state that
36. Michael Brooks & John Head, Tax Avoidance: In Economics, Law and Public Choice, in
TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 78 (Graeme S. Cooper ed., 1997).
37. G. Trixier, Definition,Scope and Importance of InternationalTax Evasion, in COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, COLLOQUY ON INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 1, 1 (1980).
38. See J.C.L. Huiskamp, Definition, Scope, and Importance of InternationalTax Avoidance,
in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 37, at 1, 7 (referring to a tax increase as a fiscal law penalty).
39. Former ABA Tax Section President James Holden stated:
Many of us have been concerned with the recent proliferation of tax shelter products
marketed to corporations ....The marketing of these products tears at the fabric of the
tax law. Many individual tax lawyers with whom I have spoken express a deep sense
of personal regret that this level of Code gamesmanship goes on.
James P. Holden, Dealing with the Aggressive Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 1999 Erwin N.
Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax Counsel, in 52 TAX LAW. 369, 369
(1999).
40. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5,at 117.
41. Sylvain Plasschaert, Ways and Means to Improve European and Wider InternationalCooperation Against Tax Evasion and Avoidance, With ParticularReference to Transfer Pricing
Within Multinational Enterprises, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 37, at 1, 9; Frans
Vanistendael, Judicial Interpretationand the Role of Anti-Abuse Provisions in Tax Law, in TAX
AVOIDANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 36, at 131, 132.
42. Graeme Cooper, Conflicts, Challenges, and Choices - The Rule of Law and AntiAvoidance Rules, in TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 36, at 13, 27. Belgium
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taxpayers are free to choose "la voie la moins imposge."4 3 This is also
known as the "fiscally least burdened" route. 44 Even today in countries
like Australia, which statutorily requires that a purposeful interpretation
of tax law must be preferred to a literal interpretation, 4 5 the general right
to plan is recognized. 4 6 Planning to reduce one's tax liability is fully
ingrained in the legal and social culture.
Judges around the world have proclaimed that tax planning to reduce
one's liability to pay tax is an entitlement. 47 No one has a moral duty to
pay any more than the law requires; 48 taxpayers consequently pay less
than they would otherwise owe. 4 9 Indeed, transactions that have no
apparent purpose other than to avoid tax are justified because "there is
nothing wrong in companies or shareholders entering, if they can, into
transactions for the purpose of avoiding or relieving them from
taxation." 50 Tax planning is accomplished through the freedom to
choose the form of the transaction that the taxpayer enters into. 5 1 The
most illuminating description of this process was provided by Judge
Barwick of the Australian High Court when he stated, "[T]he [taxpayer]
has every right to mould the transaction into which he is about to enter
52
into aform which satisfies the requirements of the statute."
Thus, tax avoidance accomplished by gaming the system is not only
acceptable, but legitimate. In the words of Judge Learned Hand, tax
avoiders "do right." 5 3 Case law at times even suggests a kind of
admiration for the clever scheme. 5 4 This is because the traditional view
is that the duty to pay tax is perceived in a most limited way because tax
legislation is mere pragmatism lacking any "universal moral

and France are examples. Id.
43. The lesser taxed way. See Plasschaert, supra note 41, at 9; Vanistendael, supra note 41, at
136. This standard led Belgium to enact a GAAR in 1993. Id.
44. Plasschaert, supra note 41, at 9.
45. Acts Interpretation Act of 1901, 1984, ss. 15AA (Austl.) (requiring courts to interpret
federal legislation to prefer an interpretation that promotes the purpose or object of the Act to one
that does not).
46. Jeffrey Waincymer, The Australian Tax Avoidance Experience and Responses: A Critical
Review, in TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 36, at 247, 250.
47. Comm'r of Taxation of Austl. v. Westraders Proprietary Ltd., (1980) 144 C.L.R. 55
(Austl.).
48. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
49. Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Westminster, [1935] A.C. I (H.L.).
50. Jacques v. Comm'r of Taxation of Austl., (1924) 34 C.L.R. 328, 362 (Austl.).
51. Westraders, 144 C.L.R. at 60.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Comm'r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting).
54. Lord Tomlin spoke of the "ingenuity" of the taxpayer. Westminster, [1935] A.C. 1.
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imperative." 5 5 Many perceive legislation in general, and tax legislation
even more so, as being the result of political compromise without any
claim to universal truth.56 Tax avoidance, to the contrary, is rooted in a
core individual right. The right can be seen in the light of two
principles: "the freedom to engage in contractual arrangements and the
rule that only laws, adopted by [the legislature], legitimate the levying
of taxes." 57 The first principle recognizes a taxpayer's right to choose
the form of the transaction. The second principle contains the implicit
assumption that tax statutes must be certain of scope and that they are
subject to strict or literal interpretation. 58 The underlying moral
principles that support tax avoidance restrict the value of argumentation
based on intent and purpose of the act. Even where legislative purpose
in the interpretation of tax statutes is required, it is still viewed with
59
skepticism.
The twin objects of literal interpretation, certainty and continuitythat is, that the status quo should not be disturbed-support the view
that a tax savings generated by a legal form is a property right. A rights
theory of avoidance treats the tax statute as "a value-neutral tool to be
used by lawyers, administrators, or judges for particular ends of their
choosing." 60 In addition, all debate is fairly well contained in a setting
dominated by the legal profession and sequestered from the public, who
are largely ignorant of the particulars.
The benign attitude towards avoidance and aggressive tax planning is
widespread and exerts a powerful influence on societies. 6 1 Phillip Jans
suggested, "[l1a fraude est contraire aux droit aux fisc, l'evasion
s'oppose seulement t ses interests."62 Whereas evasion deprives
governments of what is legally theirs, avoidance merely raises the
state's concern that taxes may not be imposed properly.
The moral posturing of tax avoidance relies on a deception. Tax law
in the modem democratic world is based on each citizen's duty as a
55. See Lord Oliver, supra note 23, at 174.
56. This is what leads textualists today to favor literal interpretation of statutes.

See, e.g.,

ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17

(Amy

Gutmann ed., 1997).
57. Plasschaert, supra note 41, at 9.
58. For a general history of interpretation of tax statutes in the U.S. and the U.K., see Barker,
supra note 9, at 826-32.
59. Grbich, supra note 7, at 105-12.
60. JAMES W. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 39 (1982).
61. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 13-14, 142-43.
62. English translation: "Evasion runs counter to the rights of the state, avoidance harms its
interests." Plasschaert, supra note 41, at 9. Les transtats indirects des benefies entre soci6t6s
interdependentes, 118 Bruylant, Brussels 1976 (translated in Plasschaert, supra note 41, at 9).
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citizen to pay a fair share of the burden of government without privilege
or exemption from tax. 63 Democracies are founded upon the critically
important principles of fairness and equality in tax. These principles
were inextricably linked to representative government. 64 Indeed, the
public duty to pay taxes is established in many constitutional provisions
or
that provide that each person is bound to contribute his proportion,
65
that each person is bound to contribute in proportion to his means.
The importance of these norms of taxation to the contribution of the
sometimes painful birth of democracies, in cases like the United States
and the French Republic, and the importance of the principle of ability
to pay leading to the income tax system cannot be understated. 66 These
core values of democratic societies are in direct contrast with the lack of
moral censure of the traditional, accepted view of tax avoidance.
Most people recognize their duty to file the most accurate return
possible and to pay their appropriate share to the government. 6 7 A
sizeable minority, however, state that their primary goal is to minimize
their taxes, 68 and these attempts at minimization sometimes take the
form of evasion or avoidance. For those who primarily derive income
from wages and who therefore bear the brunt of taxes, tax avoidance is
not a victimless crime. A legal rule that views tax savings in
accordance with formal compliance with the statute establishes a right
for one group that raises at the same time a corresponding obligation for
another group. 69 The majority of dutiful taxpayers end up assuming a
larger portion of the costs of government than do the avoiders and
evaders. This outcome mocks the social values of the income tax in a
democratic society.
The problem with tax avoidance is the problem of a moral
perspective that leads to an equality of tax opportunity for only a few.
The liberal tradition of law guarantees the same possibilities to avoid for

63. For example, the Bolivian Constitution declared, "[t]he Taxes shall be fairly imposed,
without either exception or privilege." Const. of the Bolivian Republic of 1826, tit. XI, cl. 1H,
reprintedin CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY 180 (Albert P. Blaustein & Jay A. Sigler eds.,
1988).
64. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 193 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Haffner
1947).
65. See generally Barker, supra note 2, at 8-9 (discussing the notion of equality and the
Constitution).
66. See generally id. at 9. See also Barker, supra note 9, at 860-61.
67. Karl A. Kinsey, Measurement Bias or Honest Disagreement? Problems of Validating
Measuresof Tax Evasion 6 (Am. B. Found., Working Paper No. 8811, 1988).
68. Id.
69. See Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
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all taxpayers. This, however, is formal equality only, or equality before
the law, and only the well-to-do and well-informed can realize this
advantage. The law thus protects the strong. With due regard to
Learned Hand, he got it wrong. Democratic society will never be able
to effectively tax income according to a taxpayer's means without
turning the perceived morality of tax avoidance upside down and inside
out.
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TAx EVASION AND TAx AVOIDANCE
The liberal rights view of law also biases the way avoidance and
evasion are perceived. It does this by misconceiving the problem of
avoidance-making avoidance separate from and unrelated to evasion.
Examining avoidance without the lens of liberal moral ideology will
show its underlying affinity to evasion.
Tax avoidance can be approached by determining what it is not-that
is, criminal tax fraud or evasion. In examining the approach different
nations take to distinguish between tax avoidance and evasion, care
must be taken with vocabulary because certain terms are used
differently. It is safe to say that there are three different categories of
conduct involved. The first is tax evasion, fraud fiscal in France and
Steuerhinterziehung in Germany, which describes criminal behavior.
The second is tax avoidance, called simply tax avoidance in the U.K.
and called illegitimate, impermissible tax avoidance in the U.S., evasion
fiscale in France and Stearumaehung in Germany. 70 Tax avoidance
describes "legal" but unsuccessful tax planning. 7 1 Last, there is
permissible or legitimate tax avoidance, tax planning, or tax
minimization, which denotes fully appropriate, successful tax planning.
In order to keep the discussion intelligible, I shall refer to criminal
conduct as evasion, to unsuccessful tax planning as avoidance, and to
successful tax planning as minimization.
National laws on tax evasion are commonplace. In the United States,
the tax code criminalizes the "willful" violation of the tax law. Section
720172 imposes criminal sanctions on "any person who willfully
attempts .. .in any manner to evade or defeat any tax." 7 3 Criminal
sanctions can be imposed for the willful failure to collect or pay tax

70. See Vanistendael, supra note 41, at 131 n. 1.
71. See id. at 131; Plasschaert, supra note 41, at 9; CHRIS WHITEHOUSE, REVENUE LAWS:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (Tolley 2001) (1983).
72. I.R.C. § 7201 (2006).
73. I.R.C. § 7201.

2009l

The Ideology of Tax Avoidance

under Section 720274 or for the willful failure to pay an estimated tax,
file a return or supply information under Section 7203. 75 Section 7206
aiding in the preparation of a false or
prohibits the willful making or
76
fraudulent statement or return.
In a criminal prosecution under Section 7201, the government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the taxpayer voluntarily failed to
report transactions that he was engaged in truthfully and accurately, that
the taxpayer's conduct was intentional and willful, and that this led to
an understatement of tax or a tax deficiency. 7 7 In a criminal prosecution
under Section 7206, the government must prove the defendants made or
aided in filling a return that was false or fraudulent as to a material
78
matter.
The unifying principle of criminal liability is the willfulness
requirement. 79 Though at one time willfulness was understood in terms
of "an act done with a bad or evil purpose," 80 the modern judicial
standard is phrased in terms of "a voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty." 8 1 Three elements are clearly required in order to
establish willfulness: (1) a voluntary action, (2) 82intentional conduct, and
(3) knowledge of that which is required by law.
The traditional approach to distinguishing tax avoidance and tax
minimization on the one hand from tax evasion on the other hand, is to
recognize that tax avoidance and tax minimization are attempts to
reduce one's taxes by "lawful" means. Whether or not the conduct is
successful, the view is that the "behavior is perfectly legal." 83 Thus, tax
avoidance, as contrasted with tax effective minimization, is a lawful
activity that is simply not effective (does not accomplish the expected
result) for tax purposes.
These confident assertions are simply not a complete and accurate
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

I.R.C. § 7202 (2006).
I.R.C. § 7203 (2006).
I.R.C. § 7206(a) (2006).
Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965).
I.R.C. § 7206(1), (2). See United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1426-27 (9th Cir.

1983).
79. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 397-98 (1933), overruled on other grounds by
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
80. See United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 359-61 (1973).
81. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976). See also Bishop, 412 U.S. at 359-61.
Though Pomponio dealt with a prosecution under Section 7206, the same standard for willfulness
has been applied under Section 7701. See United States v. Kinig, 616 F.2d 1034, 1039 (8th Cir.

1980).
82. See MICHAEL I. SALZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ch. 7 (rev. 2d ed. 2002).
83.

Vanistendael, supra note 41, at 132.
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reflection of the nature of tax avoidance, however. To say that evasion
is illegal whereas illegitimate avoidance that does not work is legal is
terribly misleading. Where a taxpayer is not entitled to the fruits of his
plan, it can hardly be said that the taxpayer's position is "legal," that it
conforms to the law, is according to the law, is not forbidden or
discountenanced by the law, is good and effectual in law. 84 It is instead
"illegal," that is, not authorized by law, contrary to the law, contrary to
the principles of the law. 8 5 The difference between avoidance and
evasion is not about the legal outcome but is about the characterization
of the taxpayer's conduct, that is, a description of the legal
consequences of having engaged in tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is
86
properly described as noncriminal behavior, not as legal behavior.
Doctrine recognizes a clear line between noncriminal avoidance and
criminal evasion. The Internal Revenue Service Manual provides that
87
the distinction between evasion and avoidance is fine, but definite.
The line, however, cannot be drawn in respect to the first requirement of
a voluntary and intentional action that leads to an understatement of tax
liability since that standard is easily satisfied by the avoider.8 8 The line
must be drawn in regard to the truthfulness or accuracy of the
taxpayer's representations and in regard to the question of whether the
conduct results in a violation of a known legal duty.
A legal conclusion that the proper tax treatment is not in accord with
the taxpayer's representation of the transaction is, in a sense, a finding
that the taxpayer's representations were not true. Doctrine, however,
tends to mix the notion of truthfulness with that of knowledge; these
notions are often depicted indirectly as questions of openness and
disclosure versus secrecy and concealment. "[T]he term 'tax evasion'
can be reserved for conduct that entails deception, concealment,
destruction of records and the like, while 'tax avoidance' refers to
behavior that the taxpayer hopes will serve to reduce his tax liability but

84.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (4th ed. 1968).

85. Id. at 882.
86. The distinction can be important. Even though tax avoidance may not be subject to
criminal sanctions, it may well be subject to civil penalties. For example, a bill is before
Congress to codify the economic substance test. The bill would add Section 6662B, which would
add a substantial penalty where transactions lacked economic substance. Export Products Not
Jobs Act, S. 96, 110th Cong. §§ 201-02 (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/
bills.text/I 10/s/s96.pdf.
87. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL § 9.1.3.3.2.1 (1997).
88. Tax avoidance is sometimes defined as an activity purposefully entered into to avoid
taxes. See Cooper, supra note 42, at 28. The presence or absence of this particular motive is not
relevant to the issue of whether the taxpayer engaged in voluntary and intentional acts.
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that he is prepared to disclose fully to the IRS." 8 9
Others make this point as to the different nature of tax avoidance
even more forcefully: In engaging in tax avoidance, the taxpayer has no
reason to worry about possible detection; quite the contrary, it is often
transactions in
imperative that he makes a detailed statement about his
90
order to ensure that he gets the tax reduction he desires.
This assessment is only valid from a very limited perspective.
Dissimulation is the handmaiden of avoidance. Whereas the "tax
avoider" may have nothing to worry about in terms of criminal
prosecution, he is still concerned about detection because undiscovered
tax avoidance is successful tax avoidance. Taxpayers have substantial
incentives to conceal. After all, the taxpayer's goal in tax planning is
tax savings, and these savings are not only an important factor to ensure
the profitability of the transaction but, in many cases, may have been
91
the only reason for entering into the transaction in the first place.
Additionally, in many cases, in order to achieve significant tax savings,
taxpayers incur substantial transactional costs that would not have been
incurred but for the tax savings. 9 2 For example, in a recent case, a
taxpayer incurred $24,783,800 in transaction costs to carry out a
prearranged purchase-sale transaction that was planned to yield tax
savings of $93,500,000. 9 3 These costs amounted to 26.5% of the
expected tax savings.
What is really meant when it is said that taxpayers disclose?
Taxpayers do report the results of the transactions on their tax returns in
accordance with their construction of the applicable tax results. Returns
may not disclose, however, the details about the transactions that the
administration and courts may consider critical elements for
understanding the "true" nature of the activity in terms of the statutory
provisions. Relevant information may also be presented in different
parts of the return, thus making it difficult for administrators to
comprehensively grasp the plan.

89. BI'ITKER & MCMAHON, supra note 34, at 1-25.
90. Agnar Sandmo, The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective Review, 58 NAT'L TAX J.
643, 645 (2005).
91. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001) (analyzing a
prearranged transaction to buy shares before the declaration of a dividend and sell those shares
immediately after in order to obtain the dividend and increase the taxpayer's foreign tax credits).
92. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS:
available at
ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 23 (1999),
DISCUSSION,
http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ctswhite.pdf.
93. See ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998).
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To illustrate, take the case of captive insurance companies. 94 In
Carnation Co. v. Commissioner,95 the company entered into casualty
and property insurance contracts with American Home, a recognized
independent insurance company. 96 As part of a prearranged deal,
American Home reinsured ninety percent of the risks with Three
Flowers, Carnation's wholly-owned Bermuda subsidiary. 9 7 Due to
American Home's concerns about Three Flowers' ability to meet its
commitments, Carnation undertook to provide $3 million in additional
98
capital to Three Flowers on demand.
Carnation reported the tax results of the transactions to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) according to its claimed construction of the
transaction. Thus, Carnation's return disclosed deductible insurance
premiums. Any examination of Carnation's accounts would have
revealed that these payments had been made to an unrelated insurance
company. Three Flowers' accounts would have disclosed insurance
income and expenses, which, if ever repatriated, would have been
included in Carnation's consolidated income as foreign source dividend
income and increased Carnation's foreign tax credit limitation.9 9 The
information provided at the time would not likely have included the
facts that Three Flowers "insured" its parent's risk or that Carnation had
provided a guarantee of additional capitalization in order to ensure that
10 0
Three Flowers could cover its parent's risks.
The court found that Carnation's contract with American Home was
not insurance and that the premiums received by Three Flowers were
not income derived from insurance. 10 1 The critical facts necessary to
that conclusion were the parent-subsidiary relationship and the
capitalization guarantee. Though the taxpayer was willing to disclose
this information upon audit, it certainly would have benefitted from the
government's ignorance because assessment of Carnation's situation for
tax purposes without these facts was misleading and would have made
the assessment of Carnation's proper liability for tax impossible.
Discovery by the Internal Revenue Service without careful auditing was

94. For an account of captive insurance and tax avoidance, see William B. Barker, Federal
Income Taxation and Captive Insurance, 6 VA. TAX REV. 267 (1986).
95. 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1981).
96. Id. at 1012.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See I.R.C. § 904 (2006).
100. See infra note 102.
101. Carnation Co., 640 F.2d at 1013-14.
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10 2 Yet, there is no duty to disclose unless required by
not possible.
10 3
statute.
One reason Carnation's tax plan went awry was because the
accommodation party, American Home, insisted that Carnation
guarantee the losses of its captive insurance company. It was that
guarantee that labeled the transaction a sham. A guarantee by Carnation
of its own losses establishes a lack of relation between the legal form of
the transaction, insurance, and its obvious consequences. In other
words, no one could honestly believe that he had "insured" himself if he
were responsible for his own losses. However, there was never any hint
of wrongdoing in this case.
The absence of disapproval is even more remarkable in even more
questionable tax avoidance planning. An illuminating example comes
from E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States,10 4 a case that
involved the proper application of the transfer pricing regime of the
Code. Section 482 empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to reallocate
income and deductions among related entities in order to prevent
evasion or to clearly reflect the income of the entities. 10 5 Du Pont's
plan, which was subsequently executed, was to set up a wholly-owned
subsidiary [DISA] in Switzerland to purchase U.S. manufactured goods
from the parent company and to sell these goods to related European
distributors.
In the process of developing the strategy, those promoting it faced
substantial opposition from Du Pont's operating divisions due to their
view that the scheme conflicted with the appropriate allocation of
profits among the divisions of Du Pont. 10 6 Consensus was achieved
only because all were convinced that the plan would achieve significant
tax savings and because it was agreed that the profits of the various
divisions would be recalculated ignoring the role of DISA, showing the
economic contributions of the various divisions for performance
10 7
evaluation and compensation purposes.

102. Section 6038 requires that taxpayers who are in control of a foreign corporation report
certain information with respect to the activities of that corporation to the IRS. I.R.C. § 6038
(2006). This includes information on related party transactions. In the early days of captive
insurance companies, taxpayers assumed that the use of intermediary unrelated insurance
companies shielded them from this reporting requirement. [Author's experience.]
103. For example, under U.S. law, information with respect to certain "reportable and listed"
transactions is required to be reported. I.R.C. § 6407 (2006). See also I.R.C. § 6662A (2006)
(accuracy-related penalty).
104. 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
105. I.R.C. § 482 (2006).
106. EL. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 608 F.2d at 447.
107. Id.
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It was openly acknowledged that the resulting price to DISA was
"artificially low" 10 8 or "fictitious." 10 9 There was also concern that these
prices were significantly lower than those charged to other related
entities.110
Du Pont's Treasury Department, however, argued as
follows:
It would seem to be desirable to bill the tax haven subsidiary at less
than an "arm's length" price because: (1) the pricing might not be
challenged by the revenue agent; (2) if the pricing is challenged, we
might sustain such transfer prices; (3) if we cannot sustain the prices
used, a transfer price will be negotiated which should not be more than
an "arm's length" price and might well be less; thus we would be no
worse off than we would have been had we billed at the higher
price. I11
At trial, the key Treasury Department officer, instead of being a little
embarrassed over the terms of the scheme, nonchalantly admitted that
Du Pont would have transferred ninety-nine percent of the profit to
12
DISA if they could have gotten it by the Internal Revenue Service.
The conduct in Du Pont suggests a close affinity between tax
avoidance and evasion. How close to the line did Du Pont go?
Apparently, not even close. The court reported that the reason it
described "the special status of DISA as a subsidiary intended and
operated to accumulate profits without much regard to the function it
performed or their real worth" was simply to show how difficult it was
to show comparable arm's length prices."13 The court explained that
"[i]t was not that there was anything 'illegal' or immoral in Du Pont's
plan; it is simply that the plan made it very difficult, perhaps
impossible, to satisfy the controlling Treasury regulations under Section
482."1 14 In one sense, it was completely proper to ignore the taxpayer's
motivation because Section 482 is concerned with the economic
substance of intergroup transfers and not with the taxpayer's intent or
purpose. The court's gratuitous remarks on the taxpayer's morality,
however, illuminate the moral perspective of the judge. The liberal
moral perspective evidenced in Du Pont goes to the very heart of the
avoidance/evasion question. In order to be evasion, the taxpayer's

108. Id.
109. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 42 A.F.T.R.2d 78-5081, 78-5089 (Ct.

CI. 1978).
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

El. Du Pontde Nemours & Co., 608 F.2d at 447.
Id. at 447 n.4.
Id. at 448 n.7.
Id. at 449.
Id.
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conduct must be willful. Willfulness depends on whether the taxpayer
intentionally violated a known legal duty. Though the court in Du Pont
extensively quoted the somewhat brazen comments on gaming the tax
system which analyzed the risks of failure and the likelihood of
success, 1 15 and those that acknowledged that one would have done more
if one thought one could get away with it, or cited the fact that Du Pont
kept two sets of books--one for tax purposes and one for economic
purposes, these factors were irrelevant to the question of whether Du
Pont violated a known legal duty. The morality of tax avoidance has
made this kind of subjective intent irrelevant. Even more surprising is
the irrelevance of the taxpayer's expression of the opinion that the
resulting price was "artificially low" or "fictitious" where the essence of
the issue under Section 482 is whether the taxpayer had transferred at an
arm's length price. The reason is that these statements are only the
subjective views of taxpayers. It is only the objective characterization
of taxpayers' conduct that matters. This objective characterization is
from the point of view of the legal characterization of a taxpayer's
representation of his situation.
The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Bishop that the reason
Congress provided a willfulness requirement for criminal tax evasion
was to "construct penalties that separate the purposeful tax violator
l 6
from the well-meaning, but easily confused, mass of taxpayers.""
Sophisticated tax planners who intentionally game the system hardly fit
into this category of "the well-meaning, but easily confused, mass of
taxpayers." Yet sophisticated taxpayers receive the equal protection of
this doctrine. That is because an actual bona fide misconception of the
law is a defense if "the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose,
knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence, required to establish a
' 1 17
material element of the offense."
Du Pont illustrates the breadth of protection that a misconception of
law can afford. When one reviews the rationale behind the plan, one
cannot help but see expressed an unbridled optimism that this plan will
work. Tax avoiders bolstered by a certain moral perspective are
confident that they are on the side of right. Practically any argument
will establish a bona fide misconception and save them from a charge of
fraud. Their confidence is not unrealistic, for they employ attorneys
115.

Indeed, books on tax planning recommend that one must consider the odds of success

just as a businessman considers them on making normal business decisions every day.
1 MICHIE'S FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK 451 (Joseph E. Gibson ed., 1970).
116. 412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973).
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (1985). See Battjes v. United States, 172 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir.
1949).
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who have been trained to argue any side in an adversarial system.
President Roosevelt's cynical remarks are close to the mark: "'[t]ax
avoidance' . . . means that you hire a $250,000-fee lawyer, and he
changes the word 'evasion' into the word 'avoidance."'' 118 According
to the court in Du Pont, there is not even the slightest moral duty to try
to get the transfer price right.' 19
The captive insurance company issue demonstrates a quite different
aspect of the misconception of law defense. The tax law, then and now,
distinguishes provisions for self-insurance reserves, not deductible by
120
taxpayers, and insurance premium payments, which are deductible.
The captive insurance industry represented a high degree of tax
sophistication. At the time when captive insurance companies started to
become popular, those involved with setting up these corporations were
aware of captive insurance's essential nature. For example, in Mobil
Oil Corp. v. United States, 12 1 the employee responsible for planning
explained:
Outside insurance, of course, refers to covering insurable risks by
paying a premium to a non-affiliated insurance company in return for
an agreement that the insurance company would indemnify the insured
for losses suffered. Self insurance is usually handled by setting aside
premiums out of current earnings into a reserve for self-insurance;
losses are charged against this reserve. Self-insurance can also be
worked through an insurance affiliate. Under this system, operating
subsidiaries pay premiums to an affiliated insurance company.
From the point of view of those in the industry, captive insurance
arrangements were unequivocally self insurance, not insurance. But
lawyers know that that understanding is immaterial to the question of
willfulness because these statements only represent the truth of captive
arrangements from the point of view of economics, finance, commercial
dealings, or even just plain common sense. It is only, however, from
the point of view of the legal characterization of a taxpayer's
118. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 333 (1960).
119. Section 482 is a mixture of several important principles and policies of income tax law
including tax avoidance principles, the assignment of income doctrine, general deduction
theories, and clear reflection of net income under the parties accounting method. BORIS I.
BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS I 13.20(1)(b) (7th ed. 2006). Though the use of Section 482 is only available to
the government (Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1A(b)(3) (1968)), it does not follow that the taxpayer can
disregard general tax principles and policies in setting its prices. Indeed, Treas. Reg. § 1.482I A(a)(3) permits taxpayers to report a price different from those actually charged on a timely
filed return if necessary to reflect an arm's length result.
120. See Barker, supra note 94, at 274-76.
121. 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985).
122. See Barker, supra note 94, at 284.
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representation of his situation that willfulness for criminal purposes is
determined.
Tax avoidance, as defined in this paper, is the unsuccessful attempt to
reduce one's taxes. 123 Though taxpayers are proven wrong in their
conclusion, it is obvious that taxpayers do not engage in tax fraud under
current doctrine. This is true because, even though taxpayers engage in
voluntary tax planning, even though taxpayers intentionally engage in
artificial and manipulative conduct in an attempt to reduce their taxes,
and even though taxpayers may report strained versions of the facts or
little fact at all, taxpayers lack the knowledge of the legal requirements
of the tax laws and believe, even though sometimes foolishly, that the
plan they have created could work.
Though tax planners might be wrong, their defense to tax fraud is
predicated on "an actual, bona fide misconception of the law." 124 Such
a misconception is a defense to tax fraud if it negates "the purpose,
knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a
material element of the offense." 125 In United States v. Critizer, the
court concluded that "[i]t is settled that when the law is vague or highly
debatable, a defendant-actually or impliedly-lacks the requisite
intent to violate it." 12 6 There, even though the defendant was told by
the Internal Revenue Service that rent from Indian lands was income,
the Bureau of Indian Affairs had informed her that in their opinion it
was tax exempt. The result of this intra-governmental disagreement
was that the taxpayer did not report the income and, thus, concealed the
facts necessary for any IRS determination. According to Critizer, this
was not fraud. 127 Similarly, novel questions of tax law 12 8 or unique
legal questions have been held as a matter of law to negate fraud.
Yet tax planners by necessity often knowingly operate close to the
line. Just as obviously, those who do not succeed have crossed the line,
whether they are detected or not. The Supreme Court once concluded
that in criminal matters it is not unfair "to require that one who
deliberately goes perilously close to an area of prescribed conduct shall
take the risk that he may cross the line." 129 This doctrine has not been
applied to tax avoidance, however.
123. See supra Part III.
124. See Battjes v. United States, 172 F.2d 1,4 (6th Cir. 1949).
125. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (1985).
126. United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974).
127. Id.
128. See United States v. Mallas, 762 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1985) (describing a coal mining tax
shelter).
129. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952).
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Thus, whereas the tax evader solely exploits the uncertainty of
detection and not the law, the tax avoider exploits both the uncertainty
of the tax law and of detection. As long as a case for uncertainty of the
law can be established in tax, the case is one of avoidance. The liberal
tradition's ideological insistence on certainty in the application of tax
laws is also the basis for distinguishing tax avoidance from evasion.
For many, this result is obvious. It relies, however, on a one-sided or
incomplete view of tax legislation.
Tax law's domain is not simply the domain of the finite words of the
statute. The tax law is a totality of language, purposes and intent that
aims to achieve certain social goals. Tax avoidance's domain is the
shadow world that results from the incongruence between statutory
language and the context, intent or purpose of the legislation.' 3 0 Words
separated from their context and divorced from their purposes are words
without a point of view. Or, to put it another way, they are words that
the interpreter can choose any point of view from which to interpret
them. Conscious tax avoidance exploits this discontinuity. The tax
avoider's art may be described as the discovery either before or after the
fact of formal or subjectively possible interpretations creating a
veritable twilight zone of ambiguity outside the real possibilities of the
statute that accord with the legislature's intent and purpose. The
accepted ideology of tax avoidance conditions the judge to accept these
other constructions at face value, thus formally rendering the statute
vague. Consequently, there can be no fraud.
V. CONCLUSION

In America, the liberal ideology of individual liberty has been
rejuvenated. Strict or literal interpretation of tax statutes is now the
norm. This has two consequences for tax avoidance. The first is that
courts are much more likely to reach a decision based on the "plain
meaning" of the statute. In such cases, taxpayers are free to exploit
interpretations that contradict the context, intent and purpose of the act.
The second involves the situation where there is no plain meaning.
Literalism is only a preferred mode of interpretation. Where the statute
is ambiguous, the context, intent and purpose of the legislation may be
considered.
In these cases, courts recognize the mandate to make the norm actual
in terms of the legislation's intent and purpose. 13 1 When the law uses
130. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
131. See Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908). See also Corn Prods. Ref.
Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955) (gains from hedging transactions held analogous to
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concepts like arm's length pricing, the interpreters, including the
taxpayer, are directed to report their transactions in accordance with
legislative values. Whether these values are described in terms of
legislative intent, purpose or the spirit of the law, they are generally
acknowledged to be part of the law. Yet the liberal ideology of
individual rights robs these values of their full normative force. A
taxpayer may safely disregard these values without being accused of
fraud.
Rethinking tax evasion can change the incidence of avoidance in our
society because some avoiders clearly cross the line. Putting avoiders
in jail is not the point of this essay, however. Instead, the purpose of
this essay is to expose the ideology that underpins tax avoidance. It is
also to confront a system that tolerates aggressive game playing.
Exposing this ideology to the forces of democracy is the first step to
dealing with tax avoidance. A focus on this ideology can make it the
object of a struggle that can produce considerable advances in applying
tax law in a fair and equitable manner. Because this ideology
encourages taxpayers to try to avoid taxation, and discourages the
government from dealing effectively with avoidance, its demise can
change the power of avoidance to undermine taxation.
Democratic societies recognize that individual freedom is only
possible under the rule of law, but individual freedom means more than
the rights of private autonomy. Real liberty's truest expression can only
be found in a democratic society; it depends on the social rights of
citizens, acting together, to determine the content of the law under
which all individuals are to exercise their freedom. The American
people acting through Congress have mandated taxation under a
principle of equality. The task of jurists is to make both aspects of
freedom real through their decisions. The principle thrust of this
paper's critique is that jurists have failed to advance through tax a
society that is committed to maintaining and enforcing substantive
equality for its entire people.

inventory sales in order to achieve Congress' purpose).

